Guidelines for Providing Evidence and Seeking Remedies Against Malicious Recruitment in Games

PART 1

Introduction

In games with strong social elements like MMOs and SLGs, game GS (guild recruitment) activities are commonplace. Game GS aims to attract new users, boost engagement, and drive spending. However, unregulated game guild GS resort to unscrupulous tactics for user acquisition and monetization, such as persistent harassment calls or using in-game broadcasts in competitor titles to lure players with benefits and cashback offers. Consequently, GS has become widely perceived by players as “game shills” who manipulate downloads and in-app purchases.

So, how can companies detect clues of GS recruiting within games? When such unfair competition occurs, how should companies protect their rights?

PART 2

Case Introduction

Case No.: (2024) Su 02 Min Zhong 241

Case Background: Wuhan Company A Network Technology Co., Ltd. (Company A) and Jiangsu Company B Network Technology Co., Ltd. (Company B) are both online game operators. Company B obtained exclusive usage rights to the online game software “XX Island” through authorization on October 19, 2022, and acquired all rights to the game through a transfer on April 7, 2023. Company A commissioned a gaming guild to operate and promote its game.

Since 2022, Company B's staff repeatedly reported to Company A within the shared WeChat group “White Hair XX/Wuhan XX” that they had discovered recruitment activities within the “XX Island” game operated by Company A. Company B provided evidence including WeChat profiles of virtual players used for recruitment, screenshots of recruitment messages, and links to promoted games. These links all used subdomains owned by Company A, and multiple URLs for the same game redirected to identical content. Company A staff indicated they would address the issue, implementing measures such as notifying internal guilds and suspending relevant accounts. However, Company B reported that the recruitment activities persisted. Even after Company A blocked certain links, new links would subsequently appear.

Court Ruling: The court of first instance ordered Company A to cease malicious recruitment activities within the “XX Island” game, compensate Company B for economic losses of 700,000 yuan, and pay reasonable expenses of 5,500 yuan. Company A appealed, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and upheld the original judgment.

PART 3

Key Evidence Collection and Presentation Points in GS Recruitment-Type Unfair Competition Cases

1. How to Identify Clues

(1) Player Reports

Player reports are the most common source of leads. After being recruited (or harassed), players may report the incident to the game company. Companies should establish contact with reporting players to understand their interaction process with the infringing party and the information they possess.

Valuable information players can provide primarily includes: the infringing party's in-game account, other contact methods used (e.g., WeChat, QQ), the name of their guild or organization, claimed identity, background, etc.

For instance, in this case, the screenshots of recruitment messages, WeChat message captures, and game links collected by Company B were likely obtained through player reports. These pieces of evidence form a relatively complete chain: “in-game → out-of-game (WeChat, QQ groups, etc.) → redirecting to a new game.”

When communicating with players, companies should take care to protect player privacy and avoid causing unnecessary trouble for them, thereby encouraging active cooperation with the investigation.

(2) Review and Filtering

Companies may also proactively conduct periodic screenings of UGC content like world chat channels for suspicious activity. Key review points include:

- Repeated posting of fixed scripts over extended periods

- Common recruitment tactics that disparage existing servers, such as:

“This server's drop rate is too low—let's find one with better rates”

“This server has no real players—grinding monsters is boring. Looking for somewhere with PvP action.”

Additionally, leverage big data analytics to examine in-game behavioral patterns, including operational habits, peak activity times, and character behavior characteristics. Compare these against normal player activity to identify anomalies. For instance, an account frequently engaging in recruitment/verification requests with discernible patterns (e.g., using specific templates, operating during fixed timeframes), or exhibiting markedly different in-game activity trajectories compared to regular players (e.g., rarely participating in standard gameplay, instead spamming chat in public areas upon logging in), is highly likely to be a fake player.

2. Identifying the Infringing Entity

In such cases, the infringing entities may primarily include:

(1) The visible entities associated with the infringing game: the copyright holder of the infringing game, the operator, the entity receiving payment for in-game purchases (the co-operation entity), and the domain name registration holder for the download link (e.g., identified via WHOIS lookup).

For example, in this case, Company B identified Company A as the infringing party by verifying that all promotional game links originated from subdomains owned by Company A. Company B promptly communicated with Company A via WeChat group chats and retained chat records. This not only demonstrates Company B's proactive stance in protecting its rights but also provides crucial evidence to prove Company A's awareness of the recruitment activities.

(2) Overt entities involved in recruitment activities:Verified account information of entities posting recruitment advertisements on social media platforms (including but not limited to Douyin, Xiaohongshu, Xianyu, Taobao, etc.)Verified account information of public accounts/enterprise WeChat accounts used to guide user additions.

Suing as many entities as possible—including guilds, game copyright holders, game operators, payment recipients (co-publishers), etc.—enables broader jurisdictional options and enhances the potential for securing damages.

If obtaining the infringing party's identity information proves exceptionally difficult, consider applying to the court for an investigative order. After reviewing the case specifics, the court may issue such an order authorizing attorneys to collect evidence—including the infringing party's identity—from relevant entities (e.g., game distribution platforms that may hold such information).

3. Increasing Damages Awards

To enhance the court's damages award, consider presenting evidence demonstrating:

(1) Decline in revenue for the protected game: Demonstrate how user poaching has impacted revenue metrics, such as reduced ARPU (Average Revenue Per User);

(2) Increased normal user acquisition costs: User poaching essentially mimics paid user acquisition. Provide evidence of standard advertising expenses, conversion rates, and other metrics for acquiring users through social media platforms or gaming ad networks to calculate acquisition costs, thereby proving the unfair competition's profitability;

(3) High market recognition of the rights-based game: Demonstrate the game's commercial value through channel download volumes, ranking data, user reviews, media coverage, and awards received, thereby quantifying substantial losses caused by the infringing party's actions.