This case was decided by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) of England and Wales on 14 January 2026, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice in London.
The central legal issue before the Court was:
Whether in-game “gold pieces” in the online game Old School RuneScape constitute “property” within the meaning of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968.
I. Factual Background
Old School RuneScape is a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) developed and operated by Jagex Ltd. (“Jagex”), with over 100,000 concurrent players worldwide. Players acquire in-game currency (“gold pieces”) through gameplay activities such as quests and trading. Gold pieces may be used to purchase equipment or exchanged for in-game membership bonds, which are indirectly linked to fiat currency. Although the game rules prohibit real-world trading of gold, an active black market exists in practice, giving the gold pieces a relatively stable real-world economic value.
The defendant, Andrew Lakeman, was employed by Jagex as a content developer and had no authority to access player accounts. By misappropriating login credentials belonging to members of Jagex’s internal account-recovery team, he unlawfully accessed 68 player accounts, transferred approximately 705 billion gold pieces, and converted them via third-party platforms into Bitcoin and fiat currency, generating proceeds of approximately £543,000.
The prosecution charged the defendant with theft, computer misuse, and money laundering. The defence contended that the gold pieces were not “property” in law, but merely information or data, and therefore could not be the subject of theft.
At first instance, the Crown Court at Cambridge accepted the defence argument, holding that virtual gold was not property because its supply was unlimited, it lacked rivalrousness, and it amounted to no more than virtual information. Although regarded as innovative, the ruling was controversial. The prosecution appealed pursuant to section 29 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
II. Legal Issues on Appeal
The Court of Appeal identified the substance of the appeal as the proper interpretation of “property” under section 4 of the Theft Act 1968, raising four interrelated questions:
Whether in-game gold constitutes intangible property;
If so, whether such property belongs to Jagex, the players, or both;
Whether the relevant object of analysis is the virtual gold itself or the underlying computer code;
Whether the criminal law concept of “property” must align with civil law ownership.
III. Nature of the Property
The Court held that the gold pieces were not a chose in action, as players had no contractual cause of action in respect of them. Nevertheless, the gold possessed independence, identifiability, and economic functionality. It could be controlled, transferred, and deprived from a person, and therefore fell within the category of “other intangible property” under section 4 of the Theft Act.
IV. Belonging to Another
The Court concluded that the gold could simultaneously belong to Jagex and the players for the purposes of section 5 of the Theft Act. Jagex exercised technical control as the server operator, while players exercised factual possession and control over their gold. Both forms of control were sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of “belonging to another”.
V. Code Versus Asset
The Court emphasised the need to distinguish between computer code and the asset it represents. While the code itself was merely software data and not property, the gold pieces were the functional product of that code: digital assets with economic value, capable of transfer and consumption. Citing Birss LJ in Tulip Trading Ltd v Bitcoin Association, the Court observed that although digital assets exist only through software, their functional existence is sufficient to ground proprietary status.
VI. Criminal Law and Civil Law Concepts of Property
The Court reaffirmed that the criminal law concept of property serves the purpose of preventing dishonest appropriation and need not mirror civil law ownership. Even where user licence agreements deny civil proprietary rights, criminal law may still recognise possession and control. Relying on R v Hinks [2001] and R v Smith [2011], the Court confirmed that a degree of divergence between civil and criminal law concepts of property is both permissible and necessary. Illegal drugs, for example, lack lawful ownership yet remain capable of being stolen.
VII. Interpretation of “Property” Under the Theft Act
The Court held that section 4 of the Theft Act is intentionally inclusive. Anything that can ordinarily be described as capable of being stolen should be regarded as property unless expressly excluded. The defence reliance on Oxford v Moss(1979) was rejected: that case concerned pure knowledge, which cannot be exclusively possessed or deprived. In contrast, in-game gold has quantity, exclusivity, transferability, and economic value, and therefore does not constitute mere information.
The Court further drew analogies with crypto-assets, noting that Bitcoin exists only in code yet is recognised as intangible property due to its functionality and transferability. The same reasoning applied to in-game gold.
Rejecting the trial judge’s finding of non-rivalrousness, the Court held that although gold can be generated indefinitely, each unit is exclusive once possessed, akin to banknotes or coins that are infinitely producible but rivalrous in use.
Contractual disclaimers in user agreements could not constrain the application of criminal law, which focuses on factual control rather than contractual entitlement.
VIII. Comparative and Legislative References
The Court referred to comparative jurisprudence, including:
A 2012 decision of the Dutch Supreme Court recognising RuneScape virtual items as property capable of theft;
R v Dixon (2015, New Zealand), recognising digital video files as property;
Yeates v The King (2025, Victoria, Australia), holding Bitcoin to be property.
The Court also relied on the UK Law Commission’s Digital Assets Reports (2023–2024), which identify digital assets as a potential third category of property based on identifiability, independence, and rivalrousness. Reference was made to the Property (Digital Assets) Act 2025, which confirms that digital or electronic things are not excluded from being objects of personal property merely because they are intangible or not choses in action.
IX. Policy Considerations
The Court reasoned that denying proprietary status to virtual currency would leave significant forms of digital theft beyond the reach of criminal law, contrary to public expectations and the objectives of the Theft Act. While the Computer Misuse Act addresses unauthorised access, it does not capture the substantive harm of asset misappropriation. Regulatory concerns raised by the defence were held to be matters for administrative law, not determinative of criminal liability.
X. Holding
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the ruling of the Crown Court, and held that gold pieces in Old School RuneScape constitute “property” within the meaning of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968. The theft charge was therefore capable of being made out.
The Court clarified that its decision recognised virtual currency as property for criminal law purposes only, without automatically conferring civil proprietary rights. This judgment marks the first authoritative recognition under English criminal law that in-game virtual currency may constitute property capable of theft.